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t  is  still  an  unresolved  question  whether  a 
process  for  financial  services  regulatory 
cooperation  and  convergence  will  be 
included  in  the  Transatlantic  Trade  and 
Investment  Partnership  (TTIP).  From  an  end-
user’s  perspective,  it  could  be  argued  that  its 
inclusion  could  be  an  opportunity  not  only  as 
regards product choice, but also to improve the 
consumer  or  investor  protection  regulatory 
environment on both sides of the Atlantic. The 
inclusion  would  also  be  in  line  with  the 
assessments made by both the EU and the US 
that the G-20 agenda has been incorporated in 
local legislation and that both regimes are thus 
‘equivalent’. 
Cross-border  provision  of  retail  financial 
services between the EU and US is most likely 
not  very  important  and  limited  to  certain 
products, such as fund and structured products, 
credit  card  payments,  and  occasional  direct 
transfers.  At  the  wholesale  level,  services  are 
much more important, although they have been 
severely affected by the financial crisis. 
Formally, at least until today, the position is that 
a  process  for  financial  services  regulatory 
cooperation  and  convergence  will  not  be 
included in the TTIP, but that market access will 
be  ensured,  meaning  that  national  treatment 
will be applied for access to the other’s market. 
This would mean that there will be no formal 
mechanism  to  seek  to  address  mutual 
recognition  or  equivalence  of  rules  in  TTIP 
where  this  has  been  explicitly  agreed  between 
supervisory authorities. The U.S. Treasury seeks 
to  exclude  the  possibility  of  an  open  and 
transparent  process  for  regulatory  cooperation 
on  the  grounds  that  prudential  matters  are 
typically excluded from trade agreements, and 
that  their  inclusion  could  re-open  the 
discussions  on  the  Dodd-Frank  bill.  The  EU 
seeks  to  have  a  process  for  regulatory 
cooperation included in the negotiations given 
that financial services play an essential role in 
facilitating trade and investment flows between 
our two regions.  
Inclusion  could  increase  competition  and 
product  choice,  strengthen  consumer  and 
investor protection on both sides of the Atlantic 
and  improve  prudential  regulation.  While 
financial  market  integration  may  be  more 
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advanced  in  the  US,  underpinned  by  strong 
federal  regulatory  and  supervisory  authorities, 
Europe’s regulatory harmonisation only started 
about 20 years ago, and the supervisory side still 
has  to  start  with  Banking  Union.  This  paper 
assesses  EU-US  financial  markets  and  the 
importance  of  cross-border  financial  services 
trade,  outlines  the  new  post-crisis  regulatory 
model  on  both  sides,  reviews  the  possible 
impact  of  TTIP  and  the  inclusion  of  financial 
services, and concludes with an examination of 
its  potential  interaction  with  other multilateral 
and bilateral trade deals.  
1.  Mapping EU-US financial markets 
and cross-border financial services  
The  EU  and  the  US  global  shares  have  fallen 
significantly as a result of the crisis on several 
accounts,  in  relative  and  also  sometimes  in 
absolute numbers (see Table 1). The combined 
GDP  of  both  blocs  is  now  well  below  half  of 
global  GDP,  at  44%.  The  total  level  of  bank 
assets of both blocs reached about half of global 
assets  by  end  2012,  whereas  in  2006  Europe 
alone still had more than 50%. These trends will 
continue  in  the  coming  decades,  and  the 
expectation is that the EU and the US will jointly 
account for 25% of global GDP by 2050 (see for 
example Faure et al., 2010). 
Both blocs have a radically different structure of 
financial  markets,  a  bank-based  vs.  a  market-
based  model.  Total  stock market  capitalisation 
in the EU is almost half of what it is in the US, 
where  European  banks  assets  are  more  than 
three times what they are in the US. Only 19% of 
long-term  external  financing  in  the  US  is 
provided  through  banks,  while  the  remaining 
81%  is  supplied  through  capital  markets.  By 
contrast,  in  major  European  economies  bank 
lending accounts for 59% to 71% for long-term 
investment (G30, 2013, p.29). Even if the crisis 
provided resounding lessons regarding the dark 
sides  of  capital  markets,  the  diversity  of 
financing methods available in the US provides 
policy makers with useful templates to follow.  
Table 1. Overall size and change in the global share of EU and US financial markets, 2006-12 (€ bn) 
    World  EU  %  US  % 
GDP  2006  37,596  11,156  29.7%  10,110  26.9% 
  2012  55,720  12,938  23.20%  12,199  21.90% 
Gross national savings  2006  8,701  2,358  27.1%  1,622  18,6% 
  2012  13,317  2,492  18.70%  1,602  12.00% 
Bank assets  2006  53,804  27,822  51.7%  7,748  14.4% 
  2012  85,307  35,472  41.60%  10,175  11.90% 
Stock market capitalisation  2006  40,528  10,285  25.4%  14,750  36.4% 
  2012  41,362  8,090  19.60%  14,523  35.10% 
Debt securities markets  2006  49,434  17,326  35.04%  20,161  40.78% 
  2012  69,334  22,719  32.76%  22,156  31.95% 
Data sources: ECB, IMF and World Bank. 
Financial  institutions  on  both  sides  have  been 
extremely  active  in  one  another’s  markets. 
According  to  Federal  Reserve  data,  the  total 
assets  of  US  financial  institutions  in  the  EU 
stand at €1,166 billion. No data are available for 
the EU bank assets in the US. In certain financial 
services products, however, the share of the EU 
and the US is very high. For example, in OTC 
derivatives, five to six large banks on both sides 
of  the  Atlantic  control  85-90%  of  the  global 
market  (Valiante,  2010).  In  investment  funds, 
both blocs have a similar share (De Manuel & 
Lannoo, 2012).   
An  important  global  trend  triggered  by  the 
financial crisis, and one that is very pronounced 
in both the EU and US, is the decline in cross-
border capital flows, including lending, FDI and 
purchases of bonds and equities. Overall, these 
flows remain today at 60% below their pre-crisis 
peak. This decline is most pronounced in the UK 
and  continental  Europe,  followed  by  the  US, 
declining  by  82%,  67%  and  60%,  respectively 
(McKinsey, 2013, pp. 24-25). FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TTIP | 3 
 
Figure 1. US net trade position vs. EU in financial services 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Department of Commerce. 
According  to  data  published  by  the  US 
Congressional  Research  Service  (CRS),  the  US 
registered  a  consolidated  deficit  in  trade  in 
goods with the EU in 2012 of $77 billion, i.e. the 
EU  accounted  for  $265.1  billion  of  total  US 
exports (or 17.1%) and for $380.8 billion of total 
US  imports.  However,  the  US  runs  a  trade 
surplus in services. The US surplus with the EU 
in  services  has  been  consolidating  in  recent 
years  and  has  more  than  doubled  (increasing 
from $15 billion to $40 billion in 2012, i.e. the EU 
accounted  for  $193.8  billion  of  US  services 
exports  (30.7%  of  the  total  in  US  services 
exports)  and  $149.7  billion  of  US  services 
imports (or 35.4% of total US services imports) 
in 2012.  
Data  are  lacking  to  precisely  quantify  the 
importance  of  cross-border  trade  in  financial 
services  between  the  EU  and  US,  and  the 
available  data  are  not  necessarily  comparable. 
Based on US balance-of-payment data collected 
by  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (BEA)  of 
the US Department of Commerce, the US trade 
balance  in  financial  services  with  the  EU 
confirms  the  path  of  the  broader  services 
category.1  The  US  in  fact  has  historically 
registered a financial services trade surplus with 
the  EU.  Figure  1  highlights  how  this  trade 
                                                   
1  Net  trade  position  calculated  as  the  difference 
between  ‘receipts’  and  ‘payments’  under  the  entry 
“Financial  Services”  in  the  section  “Other  Private 
Services”.  
surplus  has  grown  over  the  last  few  years, 
reaching  €14  bn  in  2011,  on  total  exports  of 
€19.1bn. As expected, an important share of this 
trade surplus is registered with the UK, which 
in  2011  accounted  for  the  38%  of  this  total 
surplus.  However,  this  figure  is  very  low  as 
compared to the overall value of trade in goods 
and  services,  and  may  indicate  that  there  is  a 
huge potential for more financial services trade. 
The US also has a positive balance with the EU 
in foreign direct investment (FDI). One-third of 
total EU outward FDI stocks are located in the 
US, whereas even more comes from the US to 
the  EU  (CEPR,  2013,  p.  11).  EU  outward  FDI 
stocks in the US are more than twice as large as 
to the second most important host country for 
EU  FDI,  which  is  Switzerland.  But  the 
investment  flows  dropped  importantly  as  a 
result of the crisis. 
2.  The new post-crisis regulatory model 
from a transatlantic perspective 
Both jurisdictions, the EU and the US, attached 
great  importance  to  the  follow-up  of  the 
commitments taken in the G-20 context. In the 
US,  mostly  one  piece  of  legislation  (the  June 
2010 Dodd-Frank Act) and discretionary powers 
of  the  supervisory  authorities  (e.g.  for 
implementing  Basel  III)  have  been  used  to 
translate G-20 standards into local legislation. In 
the  EU,  the  G-20  standards  have  to  be 
implemented in multiple EU legislative acts, i.e. 
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regulations  or  directives,  to  ensure  the 
application in all member states. The crisis also 
led recently to a series of institutional changes. 
Box 1 gives an overview of the G-20 items and 
the  institutional  changes  by  subject  and  their 
follow-up in the EU and the US. 
Most items concern the regulation of wholesale 
financial  markets  and  improved  supervision, 
where  the  EU  and  the  US  have  followed  up 
closely on the G-20 commitments, although not 
necessarily in a coordinated fashion. 
 
Both blocs now have legislation in place or are 
advancing  to  legislate  on  rating  agents,  hedge 
funds,  OTC  derivatives  and  bank  capital.  The 
rules  differ  considerably  in  their  details, 
however,  since  they  emerged  in  different 
political and economic contexts. It is only more 
recently that the G-20 has started to address core 
consumer financial services issues, in the work 
on financial inclusion, for example, which was 
adopted at the St. Petersburg Summit (06-09-13). 
 
 
Box 1. G-20 follow-up legislation in the US and the EU 
Subject  Dodd-Frank (US)   EU legislation  
Credit Rating Agencies   Upgrade of NRSRO regime (Title IX, 
 Subtitle C)  
Credit Rating Agencies Regulation  
(CRA 1, 2, 3)  
Hedge funds   Title IV, amending 1940 Investment Advisors 
Act (exemptions remain)  
Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive (AIFMD)  
OTC (over-the-counter) 
derivatives on CCPs 
(central counterparties), 
trade repositories  
Title VII mandates central clearing and 
exchange trading of most OTC derivatives 
Similar rules in EU Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) 
Price transparency of 
bonds, derivatives, 
commodities 
(Idem)   Rules in draft MiFID II and MiFIR 
(Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive and Regulation) 
Short selling   -   Short selling regulation  
Basel III   Consultation on implementation ongoing   Implemented in CRD II, III, IV (Capital 
Requirements Directive and Regulation) 
Bank structure  Volcker rule  Liikaanen report, Vickers, member states 
rules 
Bank tax   (Initially proposed, but scrapped)   Financial transaction tax (FTT) in 
individual member states and through 
‘enhanced cooperation’  
Remuneration rules   (Enhanced disclosure)  CRD III and IV, AIFMD, CRA 1  
Bank resolution   Broader powers for the FDIC through the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority 
Draft Directive on Resolution and 
Recovery (RRD), Single Resolution 
Mechanism 
Institutional aspects   Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC) 
Enhanced powers for the Federal Reserve, 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB), Federal Insurance Office 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs: EBA, ESMA, EIOPA) 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)  
 
a)  The US Dodd-Frank bill 
The  Wall  Street  Reform  and  Consumer 
Protection Act (or Dodd Frank bill) is a massive 
single piece of legislation, which embodies the 
US response to the crisis and incorporates the G-
20 agenda. It was adopted in June 2010 by the 
US  Congress,  but  many  of  the  controversial 
elements  of  the  bill  are  still  awaiting  full 
application,  such  as  the  rules  on  OTC 
derivatives,  or  the  limits  on  own  account 
trading (the Volcker Rule). The controversy also 
affects  the  eventual  ‘extraterritorial’  nature  of 
these  rules,  i.e.  that  these  rules  would  also  be 
applicable to foreign-based institutions. This has FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TTIP | 5 
 
led  to  heated  discussions  between  both  blocs 
regarding  hedge  funds  and  OTC  derivatives 
legislation. 
The main change at the institutional level in the 
Dodd-Frank bill is the creation of the Consumer 
Financial  Protection  Bureau  (CFPB).  It 
furthermore reinforces the powers of the federal 
institutions,  namely  the  Federal  Reserve,  the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC). The CFPB is the first US federal agency 
whose sole focus is to protect consumers in the 
financial marketplace, with the power to verify 
compliance with federal consumer financial law 
and  taking  appropriate  enforcement  action  to 
address  violations.  It  was  created  in  2012  and 
has a budget of almost $500 million for 2014 and 
a  staff  of  1,545.2  These  figures  indicate  that, 
notwithstanding the long disputes in Congress 
regarding  its  creation  and  the  delays  in  the 
nomination of the Director, the Bureau already 
is  a  large  organisation.  It  has  launched  an 
impressive  awareness-raising  campaign  and 
initiated  some  rule-making.  Its  actions  mainly 
concern  mortgages,  credit  cards  and  financial 
education. 
b)  The EU framework 
EU rules in response to the G-20 were adopted 
over a period of three years, starting with rules 
on Credit Ratings Agencies (CRAs), over hedge 
funds  (Alternative  Investment  Fund  Managers 
Directive,  AIFMD),  to  rules  on  derivatives 
clearing  (European  Market  Infrastructure 
Regulation, EMIR) and Basel III (CRD IV). Less 
discussed  was  a  Mortgage  Credit  Directive 
harmonising  the  procedures  for  the  sale  of 
mortgage  credit  products,  on  which  no 
legislation  existed  before  at  EU  level.  At  the 
institutional level, the EU initially reacted with 
the  creation  of  European  Supervisory 
Authorities  (ESAs),  which  in  June  2012  was 
superseded by the creation of Banking Union, or 
the centralisation of supervision in the hands of 
the European Central Bank.  
All new ESAs have a specific responsibility in 
“promoting  transparency,  simplicity  and 
fairness  in  the  market  for  consumer  financial 
                                                   
2 See its website (www.consumerfinance.gov). 
products or services across the internal market” 
(Art. 7, ESA regulation). They may temporarily 
prohibit or restrict certain financial activities in 
case  they  are  seen  to  be  a  danger  to  financial 
stability.  In  practice,  however,  not  much  has 
happened  under  these  provisions.  Some 
Members of the European Parliament have been 
calling  to  make  use  of  the  possibility,  but 
without  success  so  far.  There  is  thus  nothing 
comparable to the US Consumer Bureau. 
Access  for  third  countries  is  governed  by  the 
‘equivalence’  requirement,  or  the  need  for 
equivalence  decisions  of  third-country 
regulatory  regimes.  Before  the  crisis,  the 
expression was ‘not more favourable treatment’ 
of  third-country  service  providers,  with  a 
tendency  towards  mutual  recognition.  Post-
crisis legislation insists on detailed equivalence 
examinations in the different areas of legislation, 
proposed  by  the  ESAs,  and  subject  to 
Commission  implementing  acts.  A  first  set  of 
decisions  regarding  the  equivalence  of  the 
supervisory  regimes  of  other  countries’  rating 
agencies was taken by the EU regarding the US, 
Canada and Australia, and published in October 
2012.  For  EMIR,  ESMA  made  proposals  in 
September  2013  to  the  Commission  for 
equivalence  of  rules  with  five  jurisdictions, 
including the US. 
Bank structure issues have not yet been decided 
at  the  EU  level,  although  this  was  among  the 
recommendations  of  an  independent  expert 
body,  the  Liikkanen  Group.  At  national  level, 
however, the UK reacted with the Vickers report 
and  the  utility  bank  ring  fencing,  and  France 
and  Germany  adopted  legislation  in  mid-2013 
that  set  a  timid  form  of  separation  between 
investment  and  commercial  banking.  These 
rules should not be a barrier to the single market 
or to third-country providers, although one may 
wonder why none of these countries waited for 
the EU to take the initiative first. 
3.  The benefits of a TTIP 
A  major  assessment  report  for  the  EU 
Commission forecasted significant gains from a 
transatlantic  trade  deal.  The  CEPR  report 
(Francois, 2013) also foresees significant benefits 
of  the  TTIP  in  economic  growth  as  well  as  in 6 | KAREL LANNOO 
 
trade,  increasing  from  a  partial  to  a  more 
comprehensive agreement under a limited and 
more  ambitious  scenario  depending  on  the 
scope.  Overall  imports  and  exports  are  both 
estimated to increase by 3.37% and 5.11% in the 
less  ambitious  and  ambitious  scenarios, 
respectively. A key message of the report is the 
critical  role  of  non-tariff  barriers.  As  much  as 
80% of the total potential gains could come from 
cutting  costs  imposed  by  bureaucracy  and 
regulations, as well as from liberalising trade in 
services  and  public  procurement.  Under  the 
model  calculation,  big  gains  could  also  be 
achieved  in  financial  services  trade  on  both 
sides. 
The  first  substantive  section  of  the  TTIP  will 
deal  with  the  potential  for  reducing  or 
eliminating  transatlantic  tariffs  and  non-tariff 
barriers  with  respect  to  trade  in  goods. 
Transatlantic trade is already sizeable. The EU 
exports twice as much goods (in value) to the 
US as it does to China, and the US exports three 
times  as  much  goods  to  Europe  as  to  China. 
Average transatlantic  tariffs  are  relatively  low, 
at about 3-4% on average, and higher on the EU 
side, although tariffs remain quite high in such 
categories as processed food (14.6% in the EU, 
3.3% in the US), motor vehicles (8% in the EU, 
1.2%  in  the  US),  and  footwear,  where 
negotiations  will  be  difficult.  A  reduction  in 
tariffs  could  lead  to  substantial  trade  gains, 
because  of  the  volume  of  trades.3  The  gains 
would  be  more  sizeable  if  the  agreement  also 
addressed  non-tariff  barriers  in  goods,  the 
‘harmonisation’  of  rules  covering  conformity 
and safety standards for food, medical devices, 
machinery and chemicals, which face perceived 
NTBs of about 50% (Francois, 2013, p. 18). But 
this  will  be  politically  much  more  difficult  to 
achieve,  because  of  different  institutional 
structures and political sensitivities. 
                                                   
3  In  the  Comprehensive  Economic  and  Trade 
Agreement  (CETA),  a  proposed  free  trade  and 
copyright  agreement  between  Canada  and  the 
European Union, more than 99% of all tariff lines are 
to  be  abolished,  according  to  preliminary 
information released by the European Commission, 
DG Trade, 18 October 2013. 
Even-greater gains could be achieved if the TTIP 
opens the transatlantic services economy. Most 
American  and  European  jobs  are  in  services 
sectors, which account for over 70% of US and 
EU GDP. The EU and US are each other's most 
important  commercial  partners  and  major 
growth markets when it comes to services trade 
and related foreign direct investment. The two 
economies  have  never  been  as  intertwined  as 
they  are  today  in  financial  services, 
telecommunications,  network  industries, 
advertising, computer services and other related 
activities.  Protected  services  sectors  on  both 
sides of the Atlantic, however, account for about 
20% of the combined US-EU GDP – more than 
the  agricultural  and  manufacturing  sectors 
combined.  Major  services  sectors  such  as 
electricity,  transport,  distribution  and  business 
services are subject to particularly high levels of 
protection. A targeted opening of services could 
present  vast  opportunities  to  firms  and  huge 
gains  to  consumers  in  both  the  EU  and  the 
United  States,  and  an  initial  transatlantic 
initiative  could  be  a  building  block  for  more 
global arrangements. 
A third part of the TTIP deals with both access 
to  markets,  this  is,  removing  or  relaxing 
restrictive positions on foreign equity in certain 
sectors  and  investment  protection  of  high 
quality  (where  the  EU  can  now  negotiate). 
Although FDI (both ways, as well as both stocks 
and flows) is already enormous, there is greater 
potential once a TTIP would realise a more or 
less ‘common’ investment framework. 
Access to public procurement markets will be an 
important yardstick but a tricky element, where 
states  retain  important powers,  and  where  US 
federal  law  may  be  an  impediment.  With  the 
successful conclusion of CETA, whereby all sub-
federal levels of government (the provinces) in 
Canada  have  committed  themselves  to 
bilaterally  open  their  procurement  markets,  a 
benchmark has been set for TTIP.  
According  to  the  forecasts  in  the  CEPR study, 
the greatest overall gains in output changes as 
well in trade would take place in motor vehicles, 
chemicals  and  metal  products.  But  finance, 
insurance  and  business  services  are  also 
expected to grow, although they would be more FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE TTIP | 7 
 
pronounced for the EU than for the US. There 
would also be gains for third countries, through 
improved market access.  
An important by-product of a deep TTIP would 
be  deeper  transatlantic  regulatory  integration. 
To make the TTIP work will require establishing 
a  permanent  regulatory  mechanism,  which 
should  benefit  the  public  at  large.  Today’s 
political processes on both sides work largely in 
isolation,  resulting  in  widely  different 
approaches  to  policy  problems.  A  permanent 
mechanism  would  ensure  that  regulators 
examine  the  transatlantic  impact  of  proposed 
regulations  to  examine  whether  or  not  they 
discriminate  against  foreign  suppliers  and 
determine  how  to  converge  such  regulation. 
This  should  result  in  more  homogeneous 
markets,  which  would  benefit  consumers  and 
business.  
Critics  will  argue  that  several  initiatives  were 
launched  in  the  past  to  bring  both  markets 
closer, with limited success. In December 1995, 
the  EU-US  Summit  launched  the  New 
Transatlantic  Agenda  (NTA),  which  aimed  to 
strengthen  mutual  economic  relations.  Both 
sides tried to reinvigorate the NTA in 1998 with 
the Transatlantic Economic Partnership. And in 
April  2007  President  George  W.  Bush  and 
President  José  Manuel  Barroso  created  the 
Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) to foster 
transatlantic economic integration. In the area of 
financial  services,  a  regulatory  dialogue  has 
been in place since 2003, but the dialogue is not 
transparent  and has  cooled  down  significantly 
as a result of the economic crisis to the point of 
becoming  a  mere  information  exchange. 
Europe’s  difficulties  to  decisively  address  its 
financial crisis, and the weakening of the centre 
to  the  advantage  of  the  member  states,  may 
have undermined its authority to negotiate with 
third parties. 
4.  The TTIP in the context of other 
multilateral and bilateral trade deals 
The announcement of a formal start of talks on a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
between the EU and the US on 12 February 2013 
continues a trend towards bilateral trade deals 
between the EU and strategic trading partners 
started a decade ago. The TTIP is meant to be a 
‘deep  and  comprehensive’  transatlantic  free 
trade  agreement,  thereby  including  mutual 
direct  investment,  opening  services  and goods 
markets,  addressing  non-tariff  and  regulatory 
barriers,  and  new  areas  not  yet  covered  by 
multilateral regimes. But it remains to be seen 
how deep and comprehensive the Pact will be. 
For some observers, the launch of TTIP meant 
that a new multilateral trade deal was definitely 
off the agenda for the time being. Furthermore, 
the US and the EU comprise such a large part of 
the  global  economy  that  any  transatlantic 
market-opening  deal  will  by  definition  divert 
trade  and  thus  discriminate  against  other 
trading  partners.  This  is  a  clear  violation  of 
WTO rules and thus weakens the international 
rules-based system. However, others will argue 
that  deep  bilateral  trade  deals  may  serve  to 
reinvigorate ‘deeper’ multilateralism. The more 
important  FTAs  in  the  world  –  the  Korea-US 
and  the  Korea-EU,  CETA,  negotiations  on  the 
TPP, the RCEP, EU-ASEAN and EU-India – may 
result  in  greater  depth  and  homogeneity  of 
bilateral deals. Given the size and scope of the 
transatlantic economy, standards negotiated by 
the  US  and  the  EU  could  quickly  become  the 
benchmark  for  global  models.  As  a  reminder 
that  the  one  does  not  exclude  the  other,  only 
two  days  after  announcing  the  TTIP,  the 
European  Commission  stated  its  intention  to 
open multilateral trade negotiations on services, 
including  financial  services,  with  21  WTO 
members, including the US. 
At multilateral level, the most developed forum 
for liberalisation of trade in financial services is 
the  WTO’s  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in 
Services  (GATS),  which  requires  national 
treatment  of  foreign  services  providers.  GATS 
Article XVII:1 (National Treatment) states: 
A  Member  shall  accord  to  services  and 
service suppliers of any other Member, in 
respect of all measures affecting the supply 
of  services,  treatment  no  less  favourable 
than that it accords to its own like services 
and service suppliers. 
This  applies  to  commercial  presence  whereby 
the  service  is  provided  within  a  country  by  a 
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representative  office  of  a  foreign-owned  and 
foreign-controlled  company.  This  obligation 
only applies to the extent that the WTO member 
in  question  has  made  a  national  treatment 
commitment  in  the  sector  at  stake  (here: 
financial  services)  and  has  not  inscribed  a 
limitation to its commitment:  
Under  terms  and  conditions  that  accord 
national  treatment,  each  Member  shall 
grant to financial service suppliers of any 
other  Member  established  in  its  territory 
access  to  payment  and  clearing  systems 
operated by public entities, and to official 
funding and refinancing facilities available 
in the normal course of ordinary business.  
But  this  paragraph  is  not  intended  to  confer 
access  to  the  Member's  lender-of-last-resort 
facilities, as it is clearly excluded from the scope 
of the obligation. Hence, state aid to banks, as 
happened  during  the  financial  crisis,  is  not 
subject  to  the  national  treatment  provision.  In 
one  of  the  most  controversial  episodes  of  the 
financial crisis, the AIG bail-out, the US applied 
national treatment, also for foreign banks, and 
did  not  seek  recourse  to  exceptional 
circumstances. As is now widely known, but as 
was also heavily criticised in the US, 68% of the 
collateral  flowing to AIG’s CDS counterparties 
and  paid  by  the  US  Treasury  went  to  foreign 
banks. 
Another  major  exception  to  the  national 
treatment principle is the ‘prudential exception’, 
i.e.  measures  that  are  “taken  for  prudential 
reasons”, as provided for in Paragraph 2 (a) of 
the  GATS  Annex  on  Financial  Services.  As  an 
example  of  such  measures,  the  paragraph 
mentions  measures  taken  “to  ensure  the 
integrity and stability of the financial system”. 
This  provision  may  not  be  used  to  avoid  a 
country’s  obligations  and  commitments  under 
the  GATS  agreement  on  national  treatment  or 
market access. To our knowledge, this measure 
has  not  been  invoked  by  WTO  members  to 
restrict provision of financial services, but it is a 
major exception. It ensures that a Party may act 
inconsistently with its obligations if it needs to 
do so for the stability of its financial system. The 
‘prudential  carve-out’  exists  also  in  bilateral 
trade  agreements,  such  as  the  EU-Korea  FTA 
(Art 7.38). 
5.  Financial services in the TTIP: 
Opportunity or threat?  
Despite being very important in trade on both 
sides,  and  globally,  the  question  of  whether 
financial  services  will  be  included  in  the  TTIP 
remains unanswered. Although members of the 
European  Commission,  amongst  them  Michel 
Barnier, publicly spoke in favour of its inclusion, 
the  US  is  less  favourably  disposed.4  Financial 
services  will  be  included  for  market  access 
reasons,  meaning  that  national  treatment  will 
apply, unless an explicit equivalence agreement 
has  been  concluded  for  the  matter  concerned. 
The line of some US authorities is that they do 
not want to re-open Dodd-Frank or other issues 
such  as  the  Volcker  Rule,  where  final 
implementing provisions are still awaited. They 
also argue that these matters are dealt with in 
other  international  fora,  such  as  the  Financial 
Stability Board (FSB).  
This viewpoint is short-sighted since most of the 
Dodd-Frank regulations will be adopted before 
TTIP  is  completed,  thus  when  a  regulatory 
cooperative  mechanism  should  be  in  place.  In 
addition, ultimately, the outcome of regulatory 
cooperation  or  convergence  is  in  the  hands  of 
the regulators. A process would simply require 
them to be more engaged regarding the impact 
on  the  transatlantic  market  and  seek  to  find 
ways,  if  they  believe  it  is  possible  and  in  line 
with  their  views  on  prudential  regulation,  to 
reach convergence, equivalence or the like. 
The EU has not made convergence easier as it 
watered down some key provisions of the Basel 
III  agreement  in  the  CRD  IV,  the  EU’s  capital 
adequacy rule. A key minimum common equity 
capital  or  leverage  ratio  is  not  binding  in  EU 
law, whereas it is in the US. The leverage ratios 
of  large  euro-area  banks  still  tend  to  be  1% 
lower  than  those  of their  US  peers,  even  on  a 
comparable  IFRS  basis  (ECB,  2013,  p.  39). 
Neither bloc has agreed on a globally acceptable 
accounting  standard,  meaning  that  bank 
accounts  are  not  comparable.  The  issue  of  a 
                                                   
4  See  “U.S.  Trade  Officials  Try  to  Curb  Europe’s 
Expectations”,  NYT,  12  September  2013 
(www.nytimes.com/2013/09/13/world/europe/us-trade-
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single  accounting  standard  has  been  debated 
between both blocs for over 15 years. 
From  a  user  perspective,  one  could  argue  in 
favour  of  including  financial  services  in  the 
TTIP, as it would not only reduce barriers and 
thus  strengthen  but  also  eventually  improve 
levels  of  protection,  as  well  in  prudential 
regulation, as in conduct rules. Exchange of best 
practices  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  could 
improve standards, as we are still in an upward 
movement  of  regulation.  In  addition,  as  seen 
from an EU perspective, consumer protection at 
EU level could be strengthened.  
The  impressive  start-up  of  the  Consumer 
Bureau in the US could be an argument for more 
federal-level  consumer  protection  in  Europe. 
Minimum  requirements  for  EU-wide  deposit 
protection  schemes  are  still  pending  adoption, 
and  enforcement  of  EU-wide  consumer 
protection  rules,  such  as  the  ‘know-your-
customer’  rules  and  the  provisions  against 
conflicts of interest await stronger enforcement 
in the EU. 
From a political perspective, the most important 
argument in favour of inclusion in the TTIP is to 
make financial services part of the transatlantic 
political  dialogue.  As  indicated  above,  the 
Financial  Markets  Dialogue  from  before  the 
crisis  has  been  replaced  by  information 
exchange discussions, which often lack a sense 
and direction and purposefulness. A successful 
TTIP  will  require  the  establishment  of  a 
permanent  enforcement  and  follow-up 
mechanism  through  a  ‘Trade  Committee’, 
assisted  by  specialised  Committees  and 
Working  Groups  (see  EU-Korea  FTA  Chapter 
15).  Non-inclusion  would  relegate  financial 
services to another sphere, not in line with the 
importance of the financial services industry on 
a transatlantic basis. 
Financial services are part of the EU-Korea FTA 
and CETA. The former agreement for example, 
explicitly lists all financial services to which the 
FTA applies, and allows for mutual recognition: 
A Party may recognise prudential measures 
of  the  other  Party  in  determining  how  the 
Party’s  measures  relating  to  financial 
services shall be applied. Such recognition, 
which  may  be  achieved  through 
harmonisation  or  otherwise,  may  be  based 
upon an agreement or arrangement between 
the  Parties,  or  may  be  accorded 
autonomously (Art. 7.46). 
The  agreement  also  institutes  a  dispute 
settlement  panel  specifically  for  financial 
services. 
6.  Conclusions 
Given the size of the financial markets on both 
sides  of  the  Atlantic  and  the symmetry  in  the 
follow-up  of  the  G-20  standards,  the  TTIP 
provides  an  opportunity  for  a  more 
institutionalised  framework.  Both  blocs  have 
reacted in similar ways to the financial crisis in 
strengthening their regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks  and  incorporating  the  G-20 
recommendations  into  federal  law.  Also 
consumer  protection  has  been  reinforced, 
certainly  in  the  US,  with  the  creation  of  the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. And on 
the EU side, the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM)  will  radically  change  banking 
supervision. There should thus be no reason not 
to include financial services in the TTIP. 
Inclusion of financial services could also be an 
opportunity to strengthen prudential rules and 
consumer  protection  provisions  on  both  sides. 
In  a  post-crisis  environment,  fears  that  this 
would lead to a levelling of protection seem to 
be unjustified. On the contrary, it could lead to 
an  examination,  exchange  and  recognition  of 
best  practices  in  regulation  and  enforcement, 
and  a  levelling-up  process.  Last  but  not  least, 
inclusion  of  financial  services  would  make  it 
part of the permanent regulatory dialogue that 
will  be  established  as  a  result  of  a  successful 
TTIP. 
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